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Emotion	 Mean	 Standard	deviation	 Mean	 Standard	deviation	
Guilt	 2.15	 0.85	 1.6	 0.77	
Embarrassment		 2.05	 0.9	 2.4	 0.79	
Sadness	 2.07	 0.83	 1.83	 0.8	
Fear	 1.61	 0.79	 1.5	 0.61	
	
Note.	Statistically	significant	differences	between	the	conditions	are	highlighted	
in	bold.		
	
3.2	Responses	to	the	explicit	questions	
Thirty-four	children	in	the	Ingroup	condition	provided	an	answer	to	the	
question	about	which	group	ought	to	apologise.	Of	these,	31	answered	that	their	
own	group	ought	to	apologise	and	3	answered	that	the	other	group	should	
apologise.		In	the	Outgroup	condition,	34	children	provided	an	answer	and	all	of	
them	answered	that	the	other	group	should	apologise.		This	difference	between	
conditions	is	significant,	X2(1,	N=68)=56.97,	p<.001,	r2=.92.		Thus,	children	
understood	which	group	the	transgressor	belonged	to	and	were	able	to	answer	
questions	about	group	level	responsibility.		
Thirty-six	children	in	the	Ingroup	condition	provided	an	answer	to	the	
question	about	who	ought	to	try	to	repair	the	doll.	Of	these,	26	answered	that	
they	themselves	should	attempt	to	repair	the	doll	and	10	answered	that	the	
Outgroup	member	should	try	to	repair	the	doll.		In	the	Outgroup	condition,	33	
children	provided	an	answer	to	the	question	about	who	ought	to	try	to	repair	the	
doll.		Of	these,	16	children	answered	that	they	themselves	ought	to	try	to	repair	
the	doll	and	17	answered	that	the	Outgroup	member	should	try	to	repair	the	doll	
(see	Figure	2).		This	difference	between	conditions	is	significant,	X2(1,	N	
=69)=4.07,	p=.044,	r2=.24.	Thus,	children	are	relatively	more	likely	to	report	that	
they	should	repair	the	damage	caused	by	members	of	their	own	group	than	the	
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damage	caused	by	members	of	other	groups.			Note	that	no	child	answered	this	
question	by	referring	to	either	of	the	groups.			
	
Figure	2.	Children’s	verbal	responses	to	the	question	regarding	who	ought	to	try	
to	repair	the	doll	in	the	two	conditions.		
	
3.3	Attempts	to	repair	the	doll	
	 There	was	no	difference	between	conditions	in	the	number	of	children	
who	attempted	to	repair	the	doll.		In	the	Ingroup	condition,	19	children	
attempted	to	repair	the	doll	and	in	the	Outgroup	condition,	15	attempted	to	
repair	the	doll,	X2(1,	N=74)=.26	p=.61		
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3.4	Relations	between	the	measures	
In	order	to	determine	whether	non-verbal	displays	of	guilt	were	
correlated	with	children’s	verbal	responses	and	attempts	to	help,	we	first	
created	an	aggregate	measure	of	children’s	responses	to	the	two	explicit	
questions	and	the	repair	measure,	with	each	of	the	three	measures	worth	1	
point.		Children’s	scores	on	this	aggregate	measure	could	thus	range	between	0	
(if	they	gave	no	responses	indicating	guilt)	and	3	if	they	gave	responses	that	
indicated	guilt	on	all	three	measures.	(Children	who	failed	to	answer	one	or	both	
of	the	explicit	questions	were	not	included	in	these	analyses).		Children’s	
nonverbal	displays	of	guilt	were	positively	and	significantly	correlated	with	this	
aggregate	measure,	rho(62)=.272,	p=.033,	suggesting	that	the	more	signs	of	guilt	
children	displayed,	the	more	they	subsequently	accepted	responsibility.		
Importantly,	children’s	nonverbal	displays	of	embarrassment,	sadness	and	fear	
did	not	significantly	predict	their	aggregate	scores	on	this	measure	
(embarrassment:	rho(62)=-.206,	p=.108,	sadness:	rho(62)=.048,	p=.711,	fear:	
rho(62)=.199,	p=.121).		
	
4.	Discussion	
This	experiment	was	designed	to	investigate	whether	five-year-old	children	
accept	responsibility	for	the	negative	actions	of	their	ingroup	members.		Results	
from	the	coding	of	children’s	nonverbal	behaviour	suggest	that	they	displayed	
significantly	more	signs	of	guilt	when	a	member	of	their	own	group	had	
committed	a	transgression	than	when	a	member	of	the	other	group	had	
committed	a	transgression.		These	negative	emotional	displays	appear	to	be	
specific	to	guilt.	Children	did	not	differ	in	their	displays	of	fear,	suggesting	that	
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the	differences	between	conditions	on	the	other	measures	cannot	be	explained	
by	fear	of	negative	consequences	for	their	own	group.	Nor	can	they	be	explained	
by	sadness	at	the	ingroup’s	transgression,	because	displays	of	sadness	did	not	
differ	between	the	conditions.		Finally,	displays	of	embarrassment	were	similar	
in	the	two	conditions,	further	underlining	that	the	manipulation	specifically	
affected	guilt	rather	than	other	negative	social	emotions.		
Children’s	answers	to	the	two	explicit	questions	add	further	weight	to	the	
claim	that	children	accept	responsibility	for	the	negative	actions	of	their	ingroup	
members.		The	first	question	probed	which	group	children	thought	should	
apologise	for	the	damage	caused	to	the	victim’s	valued	possession.		In	answer	to	
this	question,	almost	all	children	said	that	the	group	whose	member	had	caused	
the	damage	ought	to	apologise,	suggesting	that	they	understood	which	group	the	
transgressor	belonged	to	and	were	able	to	answer	questions	about	group	level	
responsibility.		The	second	question	probed	whether	children	thought	that	they	
ought	to	try	to	repair	the	damage	caused	to	the	object	or	whether	a	member	of	
the	other	group	ought	to	try	to	repair	the	damage.		This	question	asked	about	
children’s	own	feelings	of	obligation	rather	than	those	of	the	group	more	
generally.		In	answer	to	this	question,	children	were	more	likely	to	say	that	they	
themselves	ought	to	try	to	repair	the	doll	when	a	member	of	their	own	group	
had	broken	it.		These	differences	were	observed	even	though	children	had	very	
little	experience	of	the	groups	to	which	they	had	been	assigned.		Thus,	although	
preschool-aged	children	likely	do	not	yet	experience	collective	responsibility	in	
its	adult	form	(Lickel	et	al.,	2004),	our	results,	taken	together	with	previous	
research	(Bennett	&	Sani,	2008),	do	suggest	that	the	origins	of	this	important	
social	phenomenon	are	present	by	5	years	of	age.	
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Further	analyses	showed	that	children’s	displays	of	guilt	were	positively	
associated	with	their	responses	on	the	two	explicit	questions	and	the	repair	
measure.		The	more	signs	of	guilt	children	displayed	after	the	doll	broke,	the	
more	signs	of	accepting	responsibility	they	subsequently	showed.		This	helps	
validate	our	coding	of	children’s	guilt	displays	and	provides	further	evidence	for	
the	association	between	experiencing	guilt	and	accepting	responsibility	for	a	
group	member’s	actions.		
It	is	important	to	note	that,	whereas	previous	research	has	shown	that	
guilt	and	accepting	responsibility	lead	to	increased	helping	behaviour	in	both	
adults	and	children	(de	Hooge,	et	al.,	2007;	Ketelaar	&	Au,	2003;	Vaish,	et	al.,	in	
press),	when	this	measure	was	analysed	in	isolation,	children	were	no	more	
likely	to	actively	attempt	to	repair	the	doll	when	it	was	broken	by	an	ingroup	
member.	There	are	a	number	of	possible	reasons	for	this.	One	possibility	is	that	
there	is	more	noise	in	this	measure	than	there	is	in	the	coding	of	children’s	non-
verbal	behaviour	and	the	explicit	questions.		Children	were	not	specifically	given	
permission	to	touch	or	repair	the	doll	during	the	30-second	repair	period,	so	the	
number	of	attempts	to	repair	might	have	been	influenced	by	their	relative	
shyness	or	impatience	with	the	pause	in	proceedings.	Another	possibility	is	that,	
as	this	measure	came	at	the	very	end,	some	children	in	the	Ingroup	condition	felt	
they	had	accepted	sufficient	responsibility	for	the	harm	by	the	time	they	were	
given	the	opportunity	to	repair	the	doll.	Along	these	lines,	previous	research	has	
demonstrated	that	once	children	have	expressed	remorse	verbally	or	attempted	
to	repair	the	harm	they	have	caused,	they	subsequently	engage	in	less	prosocial	
behaviour	towards	the	victim	(Vaish	et	al.,	in	press).		Alternatively,	children	who	
answered	that	they	themselves	ought	to	try	to	repair	the	doll,	as	approximately	
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half	of	children	did	in	the	Outgroup	condition,	may	have	felt	social	pressure	to	
act	in	line	with	their	earlier	response.		This	desire	to	be	consistent,	combined	
with	a	general	tendency	to	be	helpful	(Warneken	&	Tomasello,	2006),	may	have	
led	to	relatively	high	levels	of	helping	in	the	Outgroup	condition,	obscuring	any	
effect	of	the	manipulation.		
Like	all	studies,	our	work	has	a	number	of	limitations.	First,	we	presented	
the	explicit	questions	and	helping	measure	in	a	fixed	order.		It	is	thus	possible	
that	children’s	answer	to	the	first	question	(about	which	group	ought	to	
apologise	for	the	damage)	influenced	their	answer	to	the	second	question	(about	
who	ought	to	repair	the	doll)	by	making	them	more	likely	to	answer	in	line	with	
their	first	response.		It	is	also	possible,	as	mentioned	above,	that	children’s	
answers	to	the	two	explicit	questions	reduced	their	actual	tendency	to	try	to	
repair	the	doll.	In	future	research,	it	will	be	important	to	counterbalance	the	
order	of	both	of	the	verbal	questions	and	the	repair	measure	in	order	to	ensure	
that	they	do	not	differentially	influence	each	other.		
A	second	limitation	relates	to	how	we	measured	children’s	nonverbal	
displays	of	guilt	and	other	negative	emotions.	Research	on	social	emotions	has	
not	yet	established	specific	behavioural	markers	of	guilt	(Keltner	&	Buswell,	
1996).	As	a	result,	we	asked	two	independent	raters	for	their	overall	impression	
of	whether	children	appeared	to	feel	guilt.		This	technique	has	the	advantage	that	
it	taps	into	how	children’s	emotional	responses	might	be	perceived	by	others.		It	
is	not	without	its	weaknesses	however.	Due	to	inevitable	individual	differences	
in	emotion	perception,	the	inter-rater	reliability	between	our	two	coders	was	
relatively	low	and	we	cannot	determine	which	cues	the	raters	were	using	to	
make	their	decisions.		In	future	research,	it	will	be	important	to	develop	more	
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objective	ways	of	measuring	guilt,	perhaps	incorporating	physiological	measures	
such	as	pupil	dilation	in	order	to	obtain	more	reliable	information	(see,	e.g.,	
Hepach,	Vaish,	&	Tomasello,	in	press).	
Nevertheless,	this	work	opens	up	a	number	of	interesting	avenues	for	
future	research.		First,	it	would	be	interesting	to	investigate	the	relationship	
between	the	acceptance	of	collective	responsibility	and	intergroup	bias.		
Previous	research	has	shown	that	young	children	prefer	members	of	their	own	
group	to	members	of	other	groups,	recall	relatively	more	positive	information	
about	members	of	their	own	group,	and	interpret	their	ambiguous	actions	in	a	
more	positive	light	(e.g.,	Dunham,	Baron,	&	Banaji,	2008;	Dunham	et	al.,	2011;	
Kinzler	et	al.,	2007).		Further	research	could	investigate	the	situations	in	which	
children	excuse,	or	seek	to	minimise,	the	negative	actions	of	their	own	group	and	
the	situations	in	which	they	accept	responsibility	for	those	negative	actions.		
Related	to	this,	it	would	be	interesting	to	investigate	how	collective	
responsibility	relates	to	identification.	The	acceptance	of	collective	responsibility	
has	been	taken	as	evidence	of	young	children’s	subjective	identification	with	
their	social	groups	(Bennett	&	Sani,	2008;	Tomasello	et	al.,	2012).		However,	the	
relationship	between	the	strength	of	adults’	identification	and	their	acceptance	
of	collective	responsibility	is	complex	(Klein,	Licata,	&	Pierucci,	2011).		It	would	
be	interesting	to	look	at	how	the	strength	of	children’s	identification	predicts	
their	willingness	to	accept	collective	responsibility.		Finally,	it	would	be	
interesting	to	investigate	the	origins	of	other	collective	emotions.		Just	as	
children’s	connections	to	their	group	lead	them	to	accept	collective	
responsibility,	and	potentially	experience	guilt,	for	an	ingroup	member’s	
negative	actions,	it	may	lead	children	to	take	some	credit	for,	and	even	feel	pride	
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in,	an	ingroup	member’s	positive	actions.	Whether	positive	collective	emotions	
are	present	in	early	childhood,	and	what	social	functions	they	might	serve,	are	
fascinating	questions	for	future	work.		
	 Overall,	these	findings	add	to	a	growing	body	of	research	suggesting	that	
the	group	exerts	a	powerful	influence	over	cognition	and	behaviour	from	early	in	
development.		Even	infants	prefer	members	of	their	own	groups	to	members	of	
other	groups	(Kinzler	et	al.,	2007)	and,	later	in	development,	this	influences	
whom	children	choose	to	interact	with	and	learn	from	(e.g.,	Kinzler,	Corriveau,	&	
Harris,	2011).		Other	research	has	demonstrated	that,	at	least	by	the	age	of	five	
years,	children	categorise	themselves	as	belonging	to	particular	groups	and	that	
this	has	consequences	for	their	self-descriptions	(Sani	&	Bennett,	2009).		Here,	
we	extend	this	literature	by	demonstrating	that	children	show	the	origins	of	
collective	responsibility.		In	doing	so,	we	shed	fresh	light	on	one	of	the	group-
level	behaviours	that	is	integral	to	human	social	life.	
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